| Timeline of the Conflict in Iraq |
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The war in Iraq has history. The United States support for Iraq during the Iran / Iraq war helped build the alliance between the United States and Saddam Hussein. The U.S. gave him weapons, offered diplomatic support, and fed the Iraqi army information they could use against Iran. Where ever possible the timeline items are supported with original, declassified government documents, or objective third party sources.
November 4, 1979: Iran takes western hostages. November 12, 1979: President Jimmy Carter prohibits Iranian imports to the United States "Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force."--Excerpt From "The Downing Street Memo" April 25, 1980: A secret attempt at rescuing the hostages held in Tehran fails when a helicopter and refueling aircraft collide. Gen. Richard Secord is responsible for planning a second rescue attempt, which never takes place. The Pentagon paves the way for expanded covert activities in the next century. September 17, 1980: In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and overthrow of the Shah, Iraq breaks its 1975 treaty with Iran and proclaims sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. September 23, 1980: The Iran-Iraq War begins, with mutual bombing of installations, including the Abadan refinery, and an Iraqi ground offensive. June 8, 1981: Israel bombs the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor. 1982 Iranian troops advance to within a few miles of Basra, Iraq’s 2nd largest city. April 3, 1982: Cardoen Industries, a Chilean arms manufacturing concern owned by Carlos Cardoen Cornejo, begins marketing military products, like the Cardoen-designed and manufactured cluster bomb. (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida: U.S.A. v. Swissco Properties Within the Southern District of Florida, 4/3/92, p. 5) “The report to congress is clearly inaccurate. In fact, numerous U.S. companies provided critical support to Iraqi weapons programs, including missiles”
--Exerpt from: "Gonzalez Memo to President Bush" October 5, 1982: At a meeting in New York, Saadoun Hammadi asks Secretary of State to stop the flow of American-made arms to Iran. (State Department Cable: "Iraqi Media Coverage of Foreign Minister Hammadi's Meeting with Secretary Shultz," 10/7/82) October 10, 1982: A Boston Globe story quotes Israeli ambassador Moshe Arens saying that Israel transferred arms to Iran "in coordination with the United States 'at almost the highest levels.'" Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes tells Arens that it is not U.S. policy to provide arms to Iran and that "in the current context, Arens should expect that the State Department, when asked, will issue a strong denial." (State Department Cable: "Arens' Public Remarks an Alleged U.S.-Israeli Arms Supply to Iran," 10/22/82) January 7, 1983: The CIA's assistant general counsel concludes that there are no legal prohibitions against the CIA's provision of arms to Iran. RECALL, in the previous Document the state department publicly denied selling arms to either belligerent. (CIA: "Restrictions on Exports to Iran," 1/7/83) April 8, 1983: Carl Perry, executive vice president of Hughes Helicopter, meets in Atlanta with representatives from the Department of the Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency to discuss an Iraqi proposal to exchange an MI-24 HIND D/E Soviet-designed helicopter for permission to buy up to 100 Model 500 MD TOW helicopters from Hughes. The deal would be carried out by Sarkis Soghanalian, who the Army describes as "a known international arms dealer who has had difficulties with US law enforcement agencies." General Richard Stilwell (ret.) of the Defense Department is against the idea because of Soghanalian's infamy. December 14, 1983: Lawrence Eagleburger cables embassies that "our broad interests in the region, e.g. reinforcing the Baghdad-Cairo-Amman axis against Damascus, reducing Iran's ability to use violence in support of its foreign policy objectives, and encouraging Iraq and other producers to improve the security of crude oil supply." The document highlights the importance of oil supplies in the region. 1984-1995 United States Center for Disease Control transfers West Nile virus, plague and other lethal biological agents to Iraq. January 17, 1985: The United States sells 45 Bell and 26 Hughes helicopters to Iraq. June-July, 1985: CIA Director William Casey, Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger debate a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) draft that discusses the possibility of allied countries shipping arms to Iran 's Khomeini government to counter Soviet influences. Ideas in the NSDD lead to the arms-for-hostages deals with Iran . June 11, 1985 : Upon reviewing the NSDD draft, Caspar Weinberger states that the policy changes suggested are "inexplicably inconsistent" and "would adversely affect" the U.S.-Iraq relationship. The U.S. should not encourage Western arms sales to Iran June 29, 1985 : George P. Shultz disagrees with the June 11, 1985 NSDD draft for several reasons. Shultz states that allowing allied governments to sell Iran weapons could extend the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). He believes the draft underestimates Iran animosity toward the Soviet Union and that arms sales would disturbneighboring countries. July 13, 1985 : Richard Armitage supports U.S. contact with moderate Iranians and wants to pressure allies to end the transfer of military equipment to Iran . August 2, 1985: The State Department reports that Iraq "repeated its earlier use of chemical weapons" in March. It restates that US neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War means the US does not supply arms to either side and discourages sales to Iran by allies. October 31, 1985: West German news media states that two West German weapons smuggling rings are trying to sell weapons to Iran , and perhaps Iraq , with the help of Bell Helicopter Textron and the CIA. November 21, 1985: Several arms sales laws prohibit weapons exports to Iran and require notifying Congress of sales over $14 million. A U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency official believes arms sales to Iran should not be allowed because it may prolong the war, encourage allies to break embargoes, and upset Iran 's neighbors. Congress requires disclosure of weapons sales over $14 million that are intended by the U.S. Executive Office of the President, which states that it has always complied with this law. The 1976 Arms Export Control Act does not certify Iran for exports. However, Red River Depot ( Texas ) could sell missiles to Iran that had been intended for other countries (possibly Korea (Republic) or the United Arab Emirates ). November 26, 1985: John M. Poindexter receives a Presidential Finding from CIA Director William Casey that allows U.S. weapons sales to Iran . A December 5, 1985 : Presidential Finding draft gives the Central Intelligence Agency approval to help private initiatives aimed at freeing Western hostages in Lebanon . Such initiatives could have included U.S. arms sales to Iran . January 7, 1986: CIA Associate General Counsel George Clarke believes the Presidential Finding provides legal grounds permitting the transfer of military equipment to Iran in exchange for releasing hostages. Transferring military equipment to Iran can be done without violating the Neutrality Act or the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1918, which does not cover actions by the U.S. Executive Office of the President. The National Security Act of 1947 justifies the Presidential Finding. However, it is difficult to allow third-country transfers to ineligible recipients, due to possibly involvement in terrorist activities. The new Intelligence Authorization Act requires reports to Congress of arms transfers valued at $1 million or more. January 15, 1986: George W. Clarke and CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin discuss the legality of using intermediaries as CIA agents to help sell arms to Iran . Clarke is uncomfortable using intermediaries and prefers direct CIA involvement. Despite pressure from Oliver North, Clarke refuses to decide on the legality of authorizing the Defense Department to provide weapons to an intermediary with CIA authority. A "friendly third country" would pay for the weapons and the intermediary would transfer them to the recipient ( Iran ). Clarke believes that without a written Presidential Finding, it is illegal for the CIA to have covert operations with Iran . Sporkin believes a Presidential Finding gives the CIA authority to assist the Defense Department in obtaining weapons for a third party [ Iran ]. However, the Defense Department must determine if it is allowable to deal with a CIA authorized intermediary. September 3, 1986 : Amiram Nir believes TOW Missile Shipment to Iran (October 1986) can occur quickly, according to Oliver L. North. North wants Casey and Poindexter to discuss the release of hostages. November 4, 1986: The U.S. does not mention to Iraq the reports that Greece supplied ammunition with U.S.-origin fuses to Iraq . U.S. policy allows for third-party arms transfers to Iraq , but does not encourage them to Iran . November 13, 1986: A National Security Counsel (NSC) History of Iran Initiative at 0100 hours describes HAWK spare parts sales to Iran , identifies citizens involved in sales, and describes hostage release. HAWK missile spare parts were shipped to Iran in May-August, 1986: and TOW missiles were sent in October of 1986. Richard V. Secord contacted a relative of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Robert C. McFarlane emphasized that the arms sales to Iran would not be in exchange for hostages. McFarlane delivered HAWK Missile spare parts to Tehran on May 25-28, 1986 :. Hostage Benjamin Weir's release is attributed to Terry Waite in the NSC History. While Israeli involvement is mentioned, no individuals are identified. November 13, 1986 : Ronald Reagan makes multiple denials about U.S. arms sales to Iran in exchange for hostages. He denies paying a ransom for the release of hostages in Lebanon . He denies charges that U.S. Congressional oversight over arms sales was sidestepped. Reagan justifies U.S. arms sales to Iran by saying that the few defensive weapons sold would not influence the Iran-Iraq War's outcome. November 18, 1986 : U.S. NSC advises Reagan on how to answer questions about U.S.-sanctioned arms sales to Iran , and tells him to repeat that the U.S. policy on terrorism and arms embargoes remains the same. NSC advises Reagan to deny that Weinberger called the January 17, 1986 : Presidential Finding "absurd." He must also deny that any individuals, such as North or Poindexter, violated the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The NSC gives Reagan ways to respond to questions during a press conference about the legality of arms sales and recommends he explain why his Presidential Finding directed people to avoid reporting their actions to Congress. November 19, 1986 : Ronald Reagan attempts to deflect criticism for arms sales to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages. He announces there will not be any more weapons sales to Iran . Reagan also states that the arms sales were not responsible for the release of hostages. He does not believe the arms sales were a "mistake" and will not revoke his January 17, 1986 : Presidential Finding. He states that only one or two arms shipments to Iran took place after his Presidential Finding. Reagan says arms sales helped moderates in Iran and states that Iran has since made an effort to reduce Terrorism. After first denying Israeli involvement, he then retracts his denial. Reagan does not believe the media's claim that 1,000 TOW missiles are offensive weapons that could influence who wins the Iran-Iraq War. He justifies failing to notify Congress by claiming a need for secrecy and saying that the Constitution allows the President to overcome the National Security Act of 1947. December 5, 1986 : Saddam Hussein writes to Ronald Reagan, telling him Iraq feels betrayed by U.S. arms transfers to Iran . Richard W. Murphy suggests reaffirming Am eric an neutrality. December 15, 1986 : George Shultz approves of providing U.S. intelligence to Iraq . He reaffirms the U.S. policy of neutrality in Iran-Iraq war. January 1, 1987 : Discusses arms sales to Iran and Iraq from 1981 to 1986. States that U.S. share of arms sales to Iran totaled "less than two-tenths of one percent." January 21, 1987 : Discusses the pros and cons of U.S. arms transfers to Iraq . February 4, 1987 : Richard Murphy and H. Allen Holmes, assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs, oppose third country arms transfers to Iraq . Such transfers imply favoring Iraq , undermine Operation Staunch, increase the risk of terrorist retaliation against the U.S. , and provoke negative reactions in Congress. February 11, 1987: Recommends that the U.S. share information with Iraq about countries that sell arms to Iran . February 19, 1987: The U.S. looks at ways to assist Iraq while staying within the limits of a "no arms" policy. June 21, 1987 : When Italy attempts to sell Italian frigates to Iraq , the U.S. announces it has no intention of limiting weapons sales by other nations. March 16, 1988 : Saddam Hussein uses nerve gas to attack Kurds in northern Iraq . In the town of Halabja , about 5,000 men, women and children are killed. Scientists state that those not killed will still suffer from the nerve gas. March 16, 1988: Details of the Iran Contra trial show John Poindexter, Oliver North, Albert Hakim, and Richard Secord were deeply involved in procuring and selling arms to Iran in exchange for hostages. TOW missiles and HAWK missile spare parts were shipped to Israel and then Iran, or directly to Iran, in 1985. November 1986: John M. Poindexter destroyed documents by deleting messages stored in U.S. NSC computers. The U.S. Office of Independent Counsel charges John M. Poindexter and Oliver L. North with making "false, fictitious, fraudulent and misleading statements" to the U.S. Congress about actions in Nicaragua . Oliver L. North attempted to divert $10 million given by Brunei for Humanitarian assistance for the Contras to the Enterprise , which then paid U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents for information about the hostages in Lebanon . Enterprise funding was approved by Poindexter to support covert operations with the Contras. Meanwhile, Enterprise profited from weapons sales to Iran . North was in charge of the HAWK missiles sent to Iran in November of 1985. He was also involved in the likely transfer of TOW missiles from Israel to Iran in August and September of 1985. The arms embargoes imposed following the 1979 Iranian Revolution forbid arms transfers to Iran . With these profits, the four men helped fund the Contras. Evidence points to North, Secord, and Hakim founding Enterprise to support the Contras in Nicaragua . No Presidential Finding allowed the NSC to carry out covert actions in Nicaragua from October 12, 1984 :- October 17, 1986 :. Additionally, the Boland Amendment II did not allow the U.S. to fund military action in Nicaragua . U.S. intelligence agencies were not allowed to spend more than $24 million in FY 1984 to help the Contras. CIA actions in Nicaragua violated NSDD 159 and Executive Order 12333. September 26, 1989: Since Operation Staunch (embargoes) was aimed at Iran, there is no U.S. policy that prohibits selling arms to Iraq. The U.S. Embassy in Rome is told to respond with "no comment" to press inquiries about investigation of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL)- Atlanta . October 5, 1989: An agent from the Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General reports possible six-figure "kickbacks" to BNL-Atlanta officials; BNL funding of non-agricultural products with possible dual civilian and military use; inflated prices for goods; and the shipment of commodities that were not originally from the U.S. November 22, 1989 : Gale McKenzie tells Robert Barr that because dual-use items were exported to Iraq , she cannot confirm BNL-Atlanta's violations of the Arms Export Control Act. BNL-Atlanta has violated the Trading with the Enemy Act. July 19, 1990 : According to officials, " Iraq is actively engaged in developing chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile systems, and may be seeking to develop nuclear weapons as well. Iraq has been attempting to obtain items to support these proliferation activities from U.S. exporters, in some cases successfully." A report lists 73 export licenses "granted for equipment with dual or not clearly stated uses for export to probably proliferation related end users in Iraq ." Exports include bacteria and a fertilizer plant computer for the Iraqi Ministry of Minerals, "which is known to be associated with the Iraqi CW program." More export licenses were also given for the following
1990_07_19_exports_to_iraq.pdf August 2, 1990 : Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait . Iraq annexes Kuwait . August 6, 1990 : The UN Security Council approves Resolution 661, an embargo of all investment and trade, including oil, with Iraq and occupied Kuwait . President Bush orders U.S. troops to defend Saudi Arabia as part of "Operation Desert Shield." September 12, 1990: Chilean arms seller Carlos Cardoen tells the U.S. Embassy he will not sell Iraq the Bell 206L helicopters. Since "it has never been my intention to sell this aircraft to countries not acceptable for the U.S. Government," Cardoen offers to give control of the helicopters to a U.S. company, Global Helicopter Technology, Inc. . However, Cardoen's company, Swissco, is a majority owner of Global. A State Department paper later states that Global is "a company [t]hat is staffed by ex-Bell employees that work[s] closely will Bell" and is "CI's [Cardoen Industries] US partner." September 19, 1990 : Carlos Cardoen states that Cardoen Industries will not sell militarized helicopter to Iraq . October 1, 1990 : A cable talks about Carlos Cardoen's attempts to export the helicopters to Iraq and his possible role in Iraq 's nuclear program. November 8, 1990 : Cardoen Industries cannot receive export licenses from the U.S. for the modified helicopter sale. January 12, 1991 : Congress authorizes President Bush to use "all necessary means" to ensure that Iraq withdraws from Kuwait. January 16, 1991 : Coalition airstrikes against Iraq begin Operation Desert Storm. February 28, 1991 : Iraq 's accepts the UN Security Council Resolutions. Saddam Hussein's troops comply with orders to cease-fire. President Bush announces a coalition cease-fire. March 7, 1991: Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks testifies on Iraq 's weapons acquisition and biological, chemical and nuclear weapons capabilities. " Iraq today is the nightmare example of what can happen in an atmosphere of virtually uncontrolled weapons and technology proliferation. Both East and West have armed Baghdad to the teeth and now have to pay the price. Where Iraqi acquisition of weapons and technology has been restricted by law, Baghdad has gone to extreme and often successful lengths to obtain items illegally, frequently with willing third party accomplices." (pp. 77-78) Brooks says that, "having used chemical weapons (CW) against its own population in 1988, Iraq threatened CW use against Israel and the UN coalition during operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It developed its own biological weapons (BW) agents and has been devoting vast resources to the development of nuclear weapons." (p. 55) March 27, 1991: U.S. Customs agents seize an attack helicopter prototype from Global Helicopter Technologies, Inc. of Hurst , Texas . It is a modified Bell Textron 206L helicopter, made by Cardoen Industries. June 23-28, 1991 : Iraq violates UN Security Council Resolution 687 and cease-fire agreements when Iraqi troops shoot to prevent UNSCOM/IAEA inspectors from intercepting Iraqi vehicles transporting nuclear-related equipment. Later, the equipment is destroyed under cease-fire rules. July 12, 1991 : ABC News Nightline reports on U.S. shipments of weapons to Iraq , the CIA involvement in the 1980s, and Carlos Cardoen's role. It discusses Reagan's 1983 Presidential Finding that authorized the CIA to give military assistance and send weapons shipments to Iraq . Throughout the 1980s, the CIA and Deputy CIA Director Robert took part in covert arms and technology sales to Iraq . Some of the weapons the U.S. shipped to Iraq included Soviet-built missiles, U.S. cluster bombs (sent via Chile ), and possibly U.S. air-fuel bomb technology. By 1987, the CIA sent a weekly flight to Iraq with weapons. Congressional Record, Transcript of ABC News "Nightline" of July 12, 1991:, 7/18/91, pp. H5641-5644 October 31, 1991: 10 Americans, 7 South Africans, and 3 South African corporations are indicted for money laundering, fraud, and smuggling weapons to South Africa and then to Iraq . James Guerin is indicted for smuggling arms and military technology to South Africa and Iraq , and is also charged with conspiring with Carlos Cardoen to export arms to Iraq . Guerin's company, ISC, bought electronic parts from a U.S. company. He sent them to South Africa 's Armscor, which helped transferred the parts to Iraq . January 31, 1992: President George H.W. Bush issues a report to congress persuant to the "Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990" concluding that U.S. firms did not contribute to Iraq's weapons capbility. Henry B. Gonzalez, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, wrote this letter stating how inaccurate the report was, and he provides several examples of U.S. contributions to Iraqi weapons capability. December 8, 1992 : Theodore Greenberg of the Justice Department asks CIA General Counsel W. George Jameson to look into whether or not the CIA worked with BNL and if BNL funds helped buy arms or dual-use technology. (Lacey Report, Part I, 12/8/92, pp. 58, 173-174) February 24, 1993: Russia 's Foreign Intelligence Service report says, " Iraq was armed by a number of American companies, the largest of which included Hewlett Packard, Viltron, and Tekronix in violation of MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] guidelines." (p. 2) While evidence of biological programs is missing, Iraq 's questionable imports include "17 strains of various toxins and bacteria in the Am eric an biological cultures collection, tularemia included." (p. 8) February 9, 1994: Then Senator Donald Riegle wants to investigate the export of dual use materials to Iraq , which may have helped build up their biological weapons program. July 23, 2002: "Downing Street Memo" (as reported in The Sunday Times) shows the pre war discussion about building a case for war. President "Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force." September 30, 2004 : Comprehensive Report of the special advisor to the DCI on Iraq 's WMD is released. Contrary to statements about Iraq 's nuclear capabilities by administration officials, Chief Weapons Inspector Charles Duelfer stated that inspectors did not find evidence of "concerted efforts to restart the program." The report stated that biological and chemical weapons stockpiles had also been destroyed long before the U.S. invaded Iraq . October 7, 2004: Commenting on the recent Iraq report by Chief Weapons Inspector Duelfer, President Bush states that despite the fact that U.S. intelligence was wrong and Iraq did not have nuclear weapons, he feels that " based on all the information we have today, I believe we were right to take action, and America is safer today with Saddam Hussein in prison. " |
